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I. INTRODUCTION
When an employee violates both an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) standard and his or her employer's safety rules,
should the employer be held responsible? The Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (Commission), the adjudicatory body under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the OSH Act) whose decisions
may be appealed to the federal courts of appeals, has never clearly
identified a consistent analytical framework to answer this question. Under
established precedent, the Secretary of Labor has the burden of proving that
the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of a violative condition.
In a minority of the United States Courts of Appeals, the Secretary must
also prove that the violative condition was foreseeable and therefore
preventable. On the other hand, established Commission precedent
requires employee misconduct to be raised as an affirmative defense,
placing the burden of proof on the employer. Therefore, an employee's
failure to abide by an employer's safety rules and OSHA standards
theoretically could be and, indeed, has been analyzed as raising either a
lack of knowledge issue or a misconduct issue, with varying results
emerging from logically similar fact patterns, depending on the analysis
used. United States Supreme Court Justices White and O'Connor have
characterized the law in this area as a "confusing patchwork of conflicting
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approaches."' We have set forth below a description of the present state of
Commission law in this area and our suggestion to utilize the minority
Circuit Court view to establish a consistent approach.
II. BURDENS OF PROOF OF THE PARTIES
A. The Secretary's Burden-Prima Facie Case
To prove a violation of an OSHA standard, the Secretary must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the cited standard applies;
(2) there was noncompliance with its terms; (3) employees had access to
the violative conditions; and (4) the cited employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of those conditions.2
"Knowledge is a fundamental element of the Secretary of Labor's
burden of proof for establishing a violation of OSHA regulations. To prove
the knowledge element of its burden, the Secretary must show that the
employer knew, or with exercise of reasonable diligence could have known
of the non-complying condition. 3 If the Secretary cannot establish either
actual or constructive knowledge, the citation will be dismissed.
1. Actual Knowledge
The Commission has long recognized that "[b]ecause corporate
employers can only obtain knowledge through their agents, the actions and
knowledge of supervisory personnel are generally imputed to their
employers, and the Secretary can make a prima facie showing of
knowledge by proving that a supervisory employee knew of or was
responsible for the violation." 4 Under Commission precedent, "whe[re] a
supervisory employee has actual or constructive knowledge of [a] violative
condition[], that knowledge is imputed to the employer, and the Secretary
satisfies his burden of proof without having to demonstrate any inadequacy
or defect in the employer's safety program." 5 However, the United States
1. L.E. Myers Co., High Voltage Div. v. Sec'y of Labor, 484 U.S. 989, 990
(1987) (White, J., dissenting from order denying certiorari).
2. Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Indus., Inc., No. 99-0191, slip op. at 5 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003).
3. Id. (citing Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
206 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)).
4. Sec'y of Labor v. Todd Shipyards Corp., No. 77-1598 (Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n Aug. 3, 1984), available at http://www.oshrc.gov/decisions/html-
1984F/7-1598.html; see also Sec'y of Labor v. Revoli Constr. Co., Inc., No. 00-0315, slip
op. at 5 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Dec. 7, 2001) ("The actual or
constructive knowledge of an employer's foreman or supervisor can be imputed to the
employer.").
5. Sec'y of Labor v. Dover Elevator Co., Inc., No. 91-862, slip op. at I 1 (Occupational
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Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits require
that where the Secretary seeks to impute a supervisor's acts or omissions to
a corporate employer, it must also show that the supervisor's conduct was
reasonably foreseeable and therefore preventable by the employer.6
2. Constructive Knowledge
To prove constructive knowledge, the Secretary must show that the
employer could have discovered the violative condition with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.7 "Whether an employer was reasonably diligent
involves a consideration of several factors, including the employer's
obligation to have adequate work rules and training programs, to
adequately supervise employees, to anticipate hazards to which employees
may be exposed, and to take measures to prevent the occurrence of
violations."8
B. The Employer's Burden-Unpreventable Employee Misconduct
If the Secretary meets its burden of proof, the employer may raise the
affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct. "[T]o prevail
on [this defense], [the] employer must show that it has (1) established work
rules designed to prevent the violation, (2) adequately communicated these
rules to its employees, (3) taken steps to discover violations, and
(4) effectively enforced the rules when violations have been discovered." 9
Because supervisory "involvement in... [asserted] misconduct is strong
evidence that the employer's safety program is lax" and because "it is the
supervisor's duty to protect the safety of employees under his supervision,"
the employer's burden of proof is "more rigorous and the defense is more
difficult to establish" when an employer defends against an alleged
violation on the ground of unpreventable supervisory misconduct. ° "[T]he
employer must establish that it took all feasible steps to prevent the
accident, including adequate instruction and supervision of its supervisory
Safety & Health Review Comm'n July 16, 1993).
6. See L.R. Willson & Sons v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comr'n, 134
F.3d 1235, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1998); Pa. Power & Light Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 737 F.2d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1984); Capital Elec. Line Builders v.
Marshall, 678 F.2d 128, 130 (10th Cir. 1982); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1975).
7. Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Indus., Inc., No. 99-0191, slip op. at 5 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003).
8. Id. at 5-6.
9. Sec'y of Labor v. S&G Packaging Co., L.L.C., No. 98-1107, slip op. at 8
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 2, 2001).
10. Sec'y of Labor v. L.E. Myers Co., No. 90-0945, slip op. at 7-8 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Mar. 31, 1993) (citation omitted).
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employee[s].""
In accord with Commission precedent, "[t]he majority of the Circuits
have held that unpreventable employee misconduct is an affirmative
defense that an employer must plead and prove." 12 This defense is at best
difficult to prove and usually succeeds only where the employer is able to
show that a supervisor engaged in idiosyncratic and unforeseeable
behavior. As discussed below, the defense may be essentially unavailable
if the Secretary has established either that the employer had constructive
knowledge of the violation or, under the additional requirement imposed by
the minority of Circuits in imputed supervisor knowledge cases, that the
violation was reasonably foreseeable.
III. NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC & GAS CORP.
A. New York State Electric & Gas Corp.
The citations at issue in this case arose when an OSHA compliance
safety and health officer (CSHO) observed Raymond Price, an equipment
driver and operator employed by the New York State Electric & Gas
Corporation (NYSEG), using a jackhammer without wearing protective
eyewear.13 "Price and Jim Webb, a gas fitter, first class, formed NYSEG's
two-member work crew at the site."14 The CSHO approached the two men,
identified himself and presented his credentials to Webb, who was
described by both NYSEG employees as being the "crew leader."' 5 Upon
closer inspection, the CSHO "determined that Price had also not been
wearing steel-toed safety boots or protective shoe covers while operating
the jackhammer., ,
6
Based on the CSHO's observations at the work site, OSHA issued
NYSEG a serious citation alleging violation of the Act's general personal
protective equipment (PPE) standard, for failing to ensure use of protective
11. Id. at7.
12. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 88 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1996);
see also Brock v. L.E. Myers Co., High Voltage Div., 818 F.2d 1270, 1276 (6th Cir. 1987);
Daniel Int'l Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 683 F.2d 361, 364
(11 th Cir. 1982); H.B. Zachry Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 638
F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1981); Gen. Dynamics Corp., Quincy Shipbuilding Div. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 599 F.2d 453, 459 (1st Cir. 1979); Danco
Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 586 F.2d 1243, 1246-47
(8th Cir. 1978).
13. Sec'y of Labor v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., No. 91-2897, slip op. at 2
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footwear and eyewear."' The citation was amended to allege that the
failure to wear protective eyewear violated the Act's general duty clause,
rather than the PPE standard.' 8 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
affirmed the amended citation, but the Commission reversed in part,
upholding the original citation because the cited conditions were covered
under the PPE standard rather than the general duty clause.' The
Commission revised the amended citation "sua sponte to restore the eye
protection charge to its original form." 20 The Commission observed that,
because its amendment did nothing more than change the legal theory
under which the protective eyewear violation was alleged, remand was not
required.21
The Commission agreed with the AL's finding that NYSEG had
constructive knowledge of Price's misconduct.22 However, it declined to
rule on the judge's finding that Webb was a supervisory employee.23
Instead, the Commission held that the Secretary had proven the knowledge
element of its case regardless of whether Webb was characterized as a
supervisor:
If Webb was a supervisor, as the Secretary contends, then the
judge was correct in imputing his constructive knowledge of the
violations to NYSEG. If, however, Webb was merely a co-
worker, as NYSEG contends, then NYSEG could have known of
the violative conditions if it had exercised reasonable diligence
by providing adequate supervision.24
Although NYSEG presented evidence establishing three of the four
elements of its defense of unpreventable employee misconduct, the
Commission found that the company had failed to establish that it had
enforced its safety rules through adequate monitoring of its employees,
again, regardless of whether Webb was a supervisor.25 The Commission
also rejected NYSEG's argument, based on precedent from the Third and
Tenth Circuits, that the Secretary had the burden of proving that the
violation was preventable as part of its prima facie case.26 Accordingly, the
17. Id.
18. Id. at2-3.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 8.
23. ld. at 6.
24. Id. (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
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Commission affirmed the ALJ's finding of constructive knowledge.27
B. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered NYSEG's contentions that:
(a) the Commission erred in requiring NYSEG to shoulder the
burden of proving the adequacy of its safety program, when that
issue arose as part of the Secretary's prima facie case; (b) there
was insufficient proof that NYSEG's safety program was
inadequate and, therefore, the Secretary could not show NYSEG
had knowledge of the violation; (c) the evidence was insufficient
to permit Webb's knowledge to be ascribed to NYSEG on the
basis of his purported supervisory status, because Webb was not
a supervisor and, in any event, he had no actual or constructive
knowledge; and (d) even if Webb had constructive knowledge of
the violation, imputation was improper because the violation was
unforeseeable.2 8
With respect to NYSEG's first contention that the Commission had
improperly placed upon NYSEG the burden of demonstrating the adequacy
of its safety program, the Court observed, "[t]he proper allocation of the
burden regarding whether a violation constituted unpreventable conduct-
an issue closely related to, but not the same as, the burden-of-proof
,,29contention urged by NYSEG on this appeal-has split the Circuits.
After reviewing previous cases decided by the Courts of Appeals that
concerned the issue of unpreventable conduct, the Second Circuit
considered, and rejected, the Secretary's contention (which, significantly,
had not been before the Commission) that NYSEG should bear not only the
burden of proving unpreventable conduct, but also "the burden with respect
to whether it had knowledge of Price's conduct, at least where such
knowledge is based on the inadequacy of its safety policy."3 ° The Court
suggested, but did not require, that the Commission adopt a burden-shifting
framework similar to that used in employment discrimination cases, or
some other rule, and then apply it in a consistent fashion.31
With respect to NYSEG's second and fourth contentions, the Second
Circuit held that the Commission had departed from its own precedent by
improperly applying a per se rule that an employer's safety policy could
27. Id. at 8.
28. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 88 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1996).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id. at 108.
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not be adequate unless a supervisor was present at all times.32 The Court
fejected NYSEG's arguments that it could not be found to have had
"knowledge of Price's conduct by imputation from Webb because Webb
was not a supervisory employee and, in any event, he had no knowledge or
constructive knowledge of Price's conduct."33 The Court held that if Webb
were found to be a supervisor, imputation of knowledge would be
appropriate. The Second Circuit then remanded the case to the
Commission for further proceedings. 34
C. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. Remanded
On remand, the Commission declined the Second Circuit's invitation
to formulate and adopt a rule governing the evidentiary burdens of the
Secretary and employer with respect to the employer knowledge element of
the prima facie case and the defense of unpreventable employee
misconduct."s The Commission vacated the citations on the grounds that
"there are no circumstances which can reasonably be said to have put
NYSEG on notice of a need for further or more intensive monitoring of
Price or Webb."36 Commissioner Weisberg concurred in the Commission's
finding of adequate monitoring,3" but dissented on the grounds that he
would have affirmed the ALJ's finding that Webb was a supervisor.38
Commissioner Weisberg's dissent contends that the Commission should
have considered whether there were deficiencies other than monitoring in
NYSEG's safety program,39 and it also should have attempted to formulate
an evidentiary burden-shifting rule.4 °
IV. SUBSEQUENT OSHRC DECISIONS
A. Supervisor Knowledge
As shown below, the Commission generally has had little difficulty in
finding both employer knowledge and a failure to establish an
unpreventable employee misconduct defense where it has been shown that
a supervisor was involved in conduct resulting in a violative condition.
32. Id. at 109-10.
33. Id. at 109.
34. Id. at 110-11.
35. Sec'y of Labor v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., No. 91-2877, slip op. at 7
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Oct. 16, 2000).
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id. at 11 (Weisberg, dissenting).
38. Id. at 12 (Weisberg, dissenting).
39. Id. at 13 (Weisberg, dissenting).
40. Id. at 14-15 (Weisberg, dissenting).
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1. Rawson Contractors, Inc.
In this case, OSHA cited Rawson Contractors after OSHA compliance
officers observed two of the company's employees working in an unshored
trench.4' The competent person on site was an hourly union employee4 '
who allowed the work to go forward, contrary to both company policy and
applicable OSHA regulations.43 In light of the foreman's knowledge of
these requirements, the citations were found to be willful, and they were
upheld by the ALJ.4
Before the Commission, Rawson first argued that knowledge of the
hazard could not be imputed to the company because the foreman was a
non-supervisory, hourly union employee. 45  The Commission followed
established precedent to reject that argument on the ground that the
foreman was the designated competent person on the site and therefore was
responsible for ensuring safe work practices.46
Rawson then asserted the unpreventable employee misconduct
defense.47 Rawson demonstrated that it had explicit work rules on the
safety issue which had been communicated to the foreman.48 Rawson also
presented evidence that it had conducted training sessions and toolbox talks
specifically addressing proper work practices. 49 The company had also
taken steps to discover actual or potential violations by making random and
regular visits to the sites.50 In addition, Rawson had hired an outside
consultant to make unannounced inspections.5' The consultant had seen the
foreman's worksites on many occasions but had found only minor
violations.52  The foreman was given a three-day suspension for the
incident that led to the citations.53
Despite the evidence presented by Rawson, the Commission rejected
the affirmative defense on the ground that the company had failed to
present any evidence that it had ever enforced its work rules prior to the
inspection.54 "The foreman testified that he had never been disciplined for
41. Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op. at I
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003).
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 20-21.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at21.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id.
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the minor violations discovered by the outside consultant., 5   Although
Rawson's president testified that the company had previously issued
progressive discipline, including write-ups, "he could not recall nor provide
any evidence of such discipline. 56 Accordingly, the Commission agreed
with the ALJ that, "based on this void in the evidence," the company had
failed to establish the enforcement element of its affirmative defense.
5 7
After Rawson Contractors, Inc., it is clear that where there is evidence of
past violations of an employer's work rules, the employer must present at
least some evidence of discipline to succeed on the unpreventable
employee misconduct defense.5 s
2. Danis Shook Joint Venture XXV
This case arose out of an accident in which a pipefitter foreman
drowned after being pulled into a drainpipe by water draining from a
sewage treatment facility equalization basin.59 Following the accident,
OSHA conducted an inspection of the worksite, and the Secretary issued a
citation alleging that Danis Shook had violated the general duty clause by
exposing employees who entered the water in the equalization basin to a
potential engulfment hazard.60 The Secretary also issued a second citation
that alleged violations of two OSHA standards
for failing to instruct employees in the recognition and avoidance
of the hazards associated with entering a basin which contained
accumulated water; and... for failing to require employees
entering the water in the equalization basin to wear appropriate
personal protective equipment such as safety harnesses and
lifelines.61
The ALJ vacated the first citation that alleged a violation of the
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. See also Sec'y of Labor v. Arby Constr. Co., No. 03-0826, slip op. at 5
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Dec. 15, 2003) (Loye, A.L.J.) (holding that
the company failed to establish the enforcement element of the employee misconduct
defense because: (1) multiple employees, including a competent person, entered the trench;
(2) the company failed to issue written discipline during the two year period preceding the
inspection; and (3) the safety director failed to conduct inspections of the worksite).
59. Sec'y of Labor v. Danis Shook Joint Venture XXV, No. 98-1192, slip op. at 2-3
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 2, 2001), afjd, 319 F.3d 805 (6th
Cir. 2003).
60. Id. at 8.
61. Sec'y of Labor v. Danis Shook Joint Venture XXV, No. 98-1192, at 13
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Nov. 12, 1999) (Welsch, A.L.J.).
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general duty clause.62 The ALJ also vacated the item of the second citation
that alleged failure to instruct, but affirmed the item that alleged failure to
require wearing of PPE.63 The issues on appeal to the Commission were:
whether the ALJ erred in vacating the citation for failure to instruct;
whether the company "had knowledge of the failure of its employees to
wear personal protective equipment"; and "whether the judge erred in
rejecting [the company's] unpreventable supervisory misconduct defense
to" the citation for failure to wear PPE.'
The Commission found that Danis-Shook had violated the Act by
failing "to provide sufficiently specific instructions" regarding recognition
and avoidance of the hazards associated with entering a basin filled with
accumulated water.65 The Commission also found that Danis-Shook had
actual knowledge of the failure of its employee to use PPE when entering
the basin.66 The pipefitter who entered the basin and drowned was a
foreman working in a supervisory capacity and, as a result, his knowledge
of his own failure to wear PPE was imputed to the company.67
The Commission also found that Danis Shook had constructive
knowledge because it could have discovered the violative condition with
the exercise of reasonable diligence.68 Specifically, the Commission found
that the company had failed to provide adequate safety training and had no
work rules either requiring the use of PPE when entering water or
prohibiting the pipefitters from entering the equalization basins.69 Given its
failure to provide adequate safety training, the company also impermissibly
relied on the pipefitter's own ability "to recognize and avoid the hazards
associated with working in the equalization basins."70 The Commission
rejected Danis-Shook's unpreventable employee misconduct defense
essentially by adopting its constructive knowledge analysis:
We find that the defense fails here for largely the same reasons
upon which we base our finding of constructive knowledge of the
violation at issue; Danis Shook failed to establish and adequately
communicate a work rule that was designed to prevent the
hazard. We therefore conclude that Danis Shook failed to
62. Sec'y of Labor v. Danis Shook Joint Venture XXV, No. 98-1192, slip op. at 1




65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7, 10.
70. Id. at 10.
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establish that the violation was the result of unpreventable
supervisory misconduct.7 '
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Commission's reasoning
and affirmed its decision.72
3. S&G Packaging Co.
S&G Packaging was cited for failing to have guards installed on a
bag-making machine based on an inspection following an injury to a
worker whose hair became caught in the drive shaft rollers of the
machine.73  The Commission found that the employer had actual
knowledge of the violation because the unguarded rollers were in plain
view and visible to anyone who walked by the machine.74  The
Commission rejected the unpreventable employee misconduct defense on
the grounds that the employer's work rules did not prevent employees from
coming within the zone of danger while tending the machine.75 The
Commission also found that a provision in the employer's job safety
booklet prohibiting employees from placing their hands in any piece of
machinery was not enforced as written because supervisors expressly
instructed employees to reach into the machines to perform maintenance or
make adjustments.76
B. Supervisor Knowledge Plus Foreseeability
"Where it is highly probable that a Commission decision would be
appealed to a particular circuit, the Commission has generally applied the
precedent of that circuit in deciding the case-even though it may differ
from the Commission's precedent. 77 Accordingly, where a party could
appeal to either the Third,78 Fourth, Ninth or Tenth Circuits, the
71. Id. at 12.
72. Danis-Shook Joint Venture XXV v. Sec'y of Labor, 319 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 2003).
See also Sec'y of Labor v. CBI Servs., Inc., No. 95-0489, slip op. at 26 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Oct. 29, 2001) (rejecting the unpreventable employee
misconduct defense in part because an off-site project manager failed to communicate a
potential solution for moving a load to the on-site project superintendent under his
supervision).
73. Sec'y of Labor v. S&G Packaging Co., No. 98-1107, slip op. at 1 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 2, 2001).
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 10.
77. Sec'y of Labor v. Kerns Bros. Tree Serv., No. 96-1719, slip op. at 7 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Mar. 16, 2000).
78. Id. at 1.
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Commission will require the Secretary to prove both that a company
supervisor had knowledge of, or participated in, conduct violating the Act
and that the conduct was reasonably foreseeable. 79  As shown below,
shifting the burden of proof with regard to the adequacy of the employer's
safety program to the Secretary can have a significant effect on the
outcome of the case.
1. Interstate Brands Corp.
OSHA cited Interstate Brands Corporation, a baking company, for a
violation of the lockout/tagout standard, based on an accident in which the
company's chief engineer suffered an amputation of several fingers after
reaching into a machine while a rotary valve was still rotating.8" There
were three disconnect switches on the machine that were clearly labeled .
For some reason, the engineer turned only two of the three disconnect
levers to the "off' position and failed to turn the third lever which
controlled the rotary valve that caused the accident.82
The ALJ applied the test for knowledge set forth in Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission,3
which requires the Secretary to demonstrate in cases involving the violation
of a general safety standard both that a supervisor with authority to direct
that protective measures be taken was aware of the violation and that the
violation was foreseeable. 84 The Secretary may establish "foreseeability
[under the Third Circuit's test] by demonstrating the inadequacy of the
company's safety program, training or supervision.
8 5
The ALJ vacated the citations on the grounds "that the Secretary failed
to establish that the chief engineer's failure to properly lockout the rotary
valve was foreseeable."86 The judge noted that the three disconnect levers
were specifically labeled as to which system component each controlled
and that "there were several methods to verify that a component of the
system had been isolated., 87 The ALJ "also found that [the company]
adequately trained its employees, undertook inspections to discover
79. See id. at 18 (Visscher, concurring); Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Indus., Inc., No.
99-019 1, slip op. at 5 (Occupational Safety and Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003).
80. Sec'y of Labor v. Interstate Brands Corp., No. 00-1077, slip op. at 1-2 (Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 24, 2003).
81. Id. at 15.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Pa. Power & Light Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 737 F.2d
350 (3d Cir. 1984).
84. Interstate Brands, at 3 (citing 737 F.2d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1984)).
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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violations, and utilized a progressive disciplinary policy. Finally, the judge
noted that the chief engineer had an excellent safety record and a reputation
as a safe employee.""
The Commission affirmed the AL's decision on the grounds that it
was not foreseeable that such an accident would have occurred, given the
clear training and well-established lockout/tagout program maintained by
the company.89 There had been no other accidents, no reason to suspect the
engineer would act in this manner, and the company had implemented
suggested changes to its lockout/tagout program based on a prior OSHA
inspection. 9° Commissioner Rogers dissented on the vacating of a citation
item relating to verification, because she believed that the company could
have had better extrinsic means to verify deenergization of the machine.9'
This case demonstrates the significance of the legal theory utilized to
analyze the citations. Unlike the employer in Rawson Contractors, Inc.,
the employer in this case did not need to prove work rule enforcement
through prior discipline in order to prevail, as it would if the burden had
been placed on it to prove unpreventable employee misconduct.92 In both
Rawson Contractors, Inc. and Interstate Brands Corp., the employer had
strong safety programs, training, and regular inspections. Yet the result
appeared to turn on the legal analysis required under the precedent of the
relevant Circuit Court of Appeals. Had the Commission's decision in
Interstate Brands Corp. been appealable to any of the majority of Circuits
not requiring the Secretary to prove foreseeability as part of its prima facie
case, the OSHA citation might have been upheld rather than vacated. 93
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 4, 6.
91. Id. at 15 (Rogers, dissenting).
92. Compare Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op. at 22
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003), and Sec'y of Labor v.
Interstate Brands Corp., No. 00-1077 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr.
24, 2003).
93. See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Am. Wrecking Corp., Nos. 96-1330, 96-1331, consol.
slip op. at 13-14 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Dec. 20, 2001) (holding,
under the Third Circuit's imputed knowledge test, that the supervisor's misconduct in
failing to remove unsupported bricks from a steel building framework during a demolition
project was foreseeable because the contractor "did not have workrules 'designed to prevent
the violation' and did not provide adequate training to its supervisors"); Sec'y of Labor v.
Kems Bros. Tree Serv., No. 96-1719 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Mar.
16, 2000) (holding, under the Third Circuit's imputed knowledge test, that the misconduct
of a supervisor and crew in failing to wear hard hats was not foreseeable because the
company: (1) had a work rule requiring hard hats; (2) adequately communicated that rule to
supervisors and crew members; (3) provided safety training; (4) belonged to a safety
council; (5) conducted unannounced site visits to at least seventy-five percent of jobs; (6)
disciplined different supervisors for hard hat violations; and (7) gave verbal and written
warnings to employees for safety violations; moreover, the crew leader had an unblemished
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2. North Landing Line Construction Co.
North Landing Line Construction Co. (NLL), a commercial and
industrial electrical contractor, was cited by OSHA for a "violation of a
standard requiring that employees maintain a minimum distance from
energized parts and that they exercise 'extraordinary caution' when in [the]
vicinity" of such parts.94 An NLL employee died from electrical and
thermal bums suffered while standing on a ladder directly below the
energized side of a power station switch.95 The AU affirmed the citation
on the grounds "that NLL failed to comply with the minimum distance
requirement... and that it failed to exercise the requisite extraordinary
,,96caution.
The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision, finding, inter alia, that
the Secretary had proven that the job superintendent, who was working on
another ladder on the non-energized side of the power station switch,97 had
both actual and constructive knowledge of the violative condition that was
properly imputed to the employer.98 The Commission noted that "[u]nder
applicable Fourth Circuit precedent, the Secretary has the burden of
showing that [the supervisor's] conduct in violation of the standard was
reasonably foreseeable and preventable in order to impute his knowledge of
the violative conditions to [his employer]. ' 99 As in the Third Circuit, the
Secretary may satisfy its burden by demonstrating "inadequacies in the
employer's safety program, training or supervision, based on whether the
employer 'has established workrules designed to prevent the violation, has
adequately communicated these rules to its employees, has taken steps to
discover violations, and has effectively enforced the rules when violations
have been discovered.'""°
The Commission found that the job superintendent had actual
knowledge of the violative conditions because he engaged in the same
misconduct as the laborer who was injured.10' The superintendent also
"had constructive knowledge because he could have known, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, that [the employee] could have come
safety record, and crew members had not previously violated the hard hat rule).
94. Sec'y of Labor v. N. Landing Line Constr. Co., No. 96-721, slip op. at 1
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n July 20, 2001).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 14.
98. Id. at 18.
99. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 16 (quoting Pa. Power & Light Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 737 F.2d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted), cited with
approval in L.R. Willson and Sons, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
134 F.3d 1235, 1240-41, 1241 n.30 (4th Cir. 1998).
101. Id. at 13-14.
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closer than [the minimum allowable distance] from the energized
equipment.' ' 10 2  The Commission found that the job superintendent's
knowledge was properly imputed to NLL because the company provided
little or no evidence of its safety program and enforcement; the company's
work rule in its safety program requiring a safe zone between the work area
and the energized parts of the substation applied only to non-employees;
and the company had otherwise failed to provide guidance for working in
the vicinity of energized parts.' °3  The Commission rejected NLL's
affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct for essentially
the same reasons that it found the job superintendent's knowledge was
properly imputed to the company.('0
3. Arcon, Inc.
In the most recent OSHRC decision addressing the issue of
foreseeability of supervisor misconduct, the Commission affirmed most of
the items included in the two citations issued to the employer, but
dismissed three of the items on the grounds that the Secretary had failed to
show that the supervisor's misconduct was foreseeable and preventable,
relying on precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
where the incident arose. 10 5
Arcon, Inc. (Arcon), an asbestos abatement contractor, was hired to
work on an asbestos abatement project on a ship, the MV Cape Lobos,
docked in Wilmington, North Carolina."°6 Arcon prepared a work plan for
the project, assigned a three-man crew to perform the work and designated
one of the crew members, David Poole, as the supervisor of the project.0 7
"Arcon also hired Phoenix Envirocorp [(an environmental monitoring
firm)] to conduct air monitoring."'0 8 Eleven days before the work was to
begin, Arcon's safety and environmental manager, Cynthia Morey,
conducted a briefing with Poole to review the work plan for the project.' °9
During the briefing, Morey emphasized to Poole that if the material being
removed became friable, he was to stop the work and contact her
immediately."10
"On the first day of work on the boat deck, Poole used a Saws-all, a
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id. at 16-18.
104. Id. at 19-20.
105. Sec'y of Labor v. Arcon, Inc., No. 99-1707, slip op. at 12 (Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n July 1, 2004).
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id.
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reciprocating saw, to cut one of the panels away from a pipe. Other panels
broke apart as the crew removed them.""' Both activities resulted in the
release of asbestos fibers into the air." 2 The results of the air quality
monitoring conducted by Phoenix Envirocorp indicated that the crew was
being exposed to levels of asbestos fibers exceeding the permissible
exposure limit."l3 Phoenix Envirocorp immediately contacted Morey and
informed her of the high air sampling results and recommended
that the boat deck area be contained and cleaned before work
proceeded to another area of the vessel. ... Morey notified Arcon
president Arthur Hawthorne ("Hawthorne"), who telephoned
Poole at the job site. Poole told Morey and Hawthorne that the
sampling results were high "because of the way [he] started
removing the panels" and that "a chunk" of wallboard probably
"fell on the [air monitoring] cassette." Poole did not inform
Morey and Hawthorne of the deteriorated condition of the panels
or that he used a saw to cut one of the panels away from a pipe." 4
The following day, after the crew had moved to a different area of the
ship, Phoenix Envirocorp again contacted Morey to express its concerns
"that Poole had not taken appropriate steps to contain and clean the boat
deck before proceeding with work on another deck.""''
On the third day of the job
as Arcon was preparing to begin asbestos removal on the upper
deck, first assistant engineer Gregory Baccari, the.., official
responsible for approving Arcon's work area, told Poole that he
would not approve the containment until Arcon corrected the
tears, holes and gaps in the polyethylene sheeting that was used
to contain the area and covered the open area overhead where
ceiling panels had been removed. When Baccari later returned to
the work area, he found that Arcon had proceeded with the work
without correcting the containment deficiencies. He described
the area as "knee deep" in broken panels with visibility so
diminished by dust that "it was as if you were looking through a
cloud."' 16
111. Id. at 2-3.
112. Id. at3.
113. Id.
114. Id. (alteration in original).
115. Id. at 3-4.
116. Id. at 4.
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"Later that same morning, Allen Mosby ("Mosby") , a compliance
officer from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services,
boarded the vessel to investigate an anonymous complaint concerning the
manner in which Arcon was performing asbestos removal."'17  Mosby
conducted an inspection of the work and, based on the results of his
inspection, shut down the job and
cited Arcon under North Carolina's Asbestos Abatement
Program .... He also referred the case to... OSHA for possible
workplace safety and health violations. OSHA compliance
officer Andrea Reid ("Reid") conducted an investigation, and as
a result of her investigation, the Secretary issued" 8
"[two] citations alleging four serious and eight willful violations of
provisions in the asbestos standard for shipyard employment, 29 C.F.R. §
1015.1011. [The Secretary] proposed penalties totaling $108,500.""9
"Arcon contested the citations, and a hearing was held .. .,,20 The
ALJ "affirmed two serious and three willful items, affirmed four items as
serious instead of willful, and vacated one willful and two serious items.
[The ALJ] assessed total penalties of $40,450."
'
121
"The Commission granted Arcon's petition for review of ... issues
[including, inter alia,] ... whether Fourth Circuit precedent should apply to
Arcon's unpreventable employee misconduct defense with respect to
Citation [One]" and three items of Citation Two. 122 The Commission
agreed with Arcon's contention that, because either party could appeal to
the Fourth Circuit, the law of that Circuit should be applied. 23  The
Commission also agreed that "under Fourth Circuit precedent, in order to
impute a supervisor's actual or constructive knowledge where the violation
is based on supervisory misconduct, the Secretary must prove that the
supervisor's acts were foreseeable or preventable."'' 24 At the hearing before
the ALJ, Arcon had raised, and the judge rejected, the affirmative defense
of unpreventable employee misconduct. 25  However, on review, Arcon
argued instead that the Secretary had failed to establish her case-in-chief
because she had failed to prove that Poole's actions were foreseeable and
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. at 1-2.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 12.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 11-12.
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preventable.
126
The contested item of Citation One was based on Arcon's failure to
conduct the additional exposure monitoring required under asbestos
standard after the crew used a saw and crowbar to remove the panel and
Arcon was notified that exposures exceeded the permissible exposure
limit. 27 Arcon argued that the item should be vacated because Poole's use
of the saw in violation of an established company work rule was
unforeseeable and unpreventable. 128 However, the Commission noted that
the violation was "not based on Poole's use of the saw, but on Arcon's
failure to comply with the standard after Poole used the saw and Arcon was
notified about overexposures at the work site."'129 The Commission found
that the repeated warnings from Phoenix Envirocorp, coupled with
"Poole's own admissions about the manner in which he was conducting the
project," placed Arcon on notice of a need to investigate and supervise
Poole's conduct. 30  Based on Arcon's inadequate response to the
information it had received from those at the worksite, the Commission
found that the Secretary had met her burden proving that Poole's conduct
was foreseeable and preventable.' 3 ' Accordingly, the Commission affirmed
the contested item of Citation One.
32
The three contested items of Citation Two were based on Arcon's
failure to prevent the crew members from being exposed to levels of
asbestos exceeding the permissible exposure limit.133  The ALJ had
affirmed the items based on the monitoring conducted by Phoenix
Envirocorp on the morning of the first day of the project shortly after the
work began.' 34 The Commission noted that the violation at issue had
occurred at the start of the project, before any information had been
transmitted back to Morey and Hawthorne. 3 The panel found Morey's
testimony regarding her pre-job briefing of Poole on the work plan to be
dispositive on the issue of foreseeability.1 36 The Commission noted that the
Secretary had failed to address Morey's testimony; that she had expressly
directed Poole to stop work and contact her immediately if the material
became friable; and that Poole had unexpectedly failed to heed this
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 12-13 n.ll.
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 14-15.
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id.
2005] EMPLOYER KNOWLEDGE AND EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT 505
directive. 37 The panel also found that, aside from her argument that Arcon
did not have a work rule prohibiting the use of a saw, the Secretary had
failed to "show any inadequacy in Arcon's safety program, training, or
supervision until the end of the first workday when Morey and Hawthorne
failed" to respond adequately to the information they received from the
work site. 3 8 The Commission concluded that the Secretary had failed to
demonstrate that Poole's initial misconduct was foreseeable and
preventable, and vacated the three contested items of Citation Two. 3 9
The Commission's decision in Arcon, Inc. demonstrates that the
requirement of foreseeability adopted by the minority of circuits is both
reasonable and fair. Where a supervisory employee engages in unexpected
misconduct which immediately results in a violation of an OSHA standard,
the employer may not be held liable for the violation unless the Secretary
can meet her burden of demonstrating that the supervisor's acts were
foreseeable. However, even where the supervisor's acts were
unforeseeable, the employer will not escape liability if it could have taken
corrective action to prevent the violative condition after becoming aware of
the supervisory misconduct.' 4
C. Constructive Knowledge
1. Donohue Industries, Inc.
In this case, a millwright died from electrical shock after a non-
supervisory company electrician failed to ground a spot welder, in violation
of company policy and OSHA regulations. 4 ' The ALJ vacated the citation




140. Compare L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., No. 94-1546, slip op. at 2-3 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 7, 1999) (on remand) (holding that a steelworker
foreman's conduct in working on steel structural beams without fall protection was not
foreseeable where the foreman had been specifically instructed that morning to finish work
in another area and wait for safety cables before beginning work in area where violation
occurred), with N&N Contractors, Inc., No. 96-0606, slip op. at 12, 10 n.4 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n May 18, 2000) (holding that a contractor had constructive
knowledge of a non-supervisory employee's misconduct because of its prior failure to
enforce safety rules, and noting that the Secretary would have met his burden even if the
employee had been found to be a supervisor because the Secretary "effectively has same
burden" under Fourth Circuit foreseeability test as under the Commission's constructive
knowledge test), affd, 255 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 2001).
141. Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Indus., Inc., No. 99-0191, slip op. at 4 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003).
142. Id. at 1.
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sion affirmed, but "on the ground that the Secretary failed to carry her
burden of proving that Donohue [(the employer)] had knowledge of the
violative condition."'
143
The Commission held that the Secretary had failed to establish that the
company had constructive knowledge of the electrician's failure to ground
the welder.' 44 The electrician had made a conscious decision to rewire the
welder's electrical plug instead of replacing it, and did not advise his
supervisor as to his actions. 145 Because the electrician's supervisor had no
knowledge of the violation, "the issue presented [was] whether, with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, Donohue could have discovered the
ungrounded welder.' ' 146 Given the adequacy of the company's work rules
and training programs, as well as its regular inspections and disciplinary
proceedings, there could be no finding of constructive knowledge of the
violative condition. 47  In rejecting the Secretary's argument that the
equipment in question should have been inspected, the Commission found
that such inspection would not have prevented the accident in this case in
any event because the evidence showed that the welder was actually
properly grounded before the electrician had attempted to repair it.'
4 8
The Commission further noted that the electrician's failure to ground
the welder appeared "to have been the result of [his] intentional,
idiosyncratic conduct... in failing to follow a basic tenet of the electrical
trade without checking with any supervisor to determine whether he was
authorized to do So.'149 However, the Commission saw no need to address




144. Id. at 11.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at5.
147. Id. at9, 11.
148. Id. at 10-11.
149. Id. at 10 n.5.
150. Id. at 10 n.6. See also Sec'y of Labor v. Noble Drilling, Inc., No. 98-2105, slip op.
at 18 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Nov. 18, 2003) ("[The employer] had
neither actual nor constructive knowledge that [its employee] was in the elevator shaft
without fall protection. Fixing the elevator was a low priority to management personnel.
[T]he one person who gave specific instructions to [the employee] regarding the elevator
had told him to wait until he could look at it. An employer cannot reasonably be expected
to anticipate that an employee would do something so idiosyncratic as to climb down a
poorly-lit elevator tower without using fall protection."); Sec'y of Labor v. Stahl Roofing,
Inc., Nos. 00-1268, 00-1637 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Feb. 21,
2003) (holding that a roofing company did not have constructive knowledge of its roofers'
failure to tie off and wear eye protection because it: (1) formulated rules to protect its
employees; (2) adequately communicated those rules to its employees; (3) had safety
training programs; (4) enforced a progressive discipline policy when violations were
discovered; and (5) provided adequate supervision); Sec'y of Labor v. Precision Concrete
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2. Revoli Construction Co., Inc.
OSHA issued two citations for serious and willful violations to Revoli
Construction Co. after an OSHA compliance officer observed one of the
company's employees working in an unshored, unsloped trench without
wearing a hard hat. 5 ' The foreman and backhoe operator, who was the
only other employee present15 and the designated competent person at the
site,153 "was sitting in the cab of his backhoe where he could observe the
laborer in the trench."'' 54 The ALJ affirmed both citations, and Revoli
appealed only the willful citation.
5
The Commission found that Revoli had actual knowledge of the
laborer's misconduct'5 6 because, after the laborer ignored the foreman's
order to exit the trench, the foreman made no further efforts to obtain
compliance and "simply watched" while the laborer remained in the trench
and continued to work.'57 The Commission also found that Revoli had
constructive knowledge of the laborer's misconduct 58 because the
company's owner admitted that "the company did not have an enforcement
policy or disciplinary policy for employees who fail[ed] to follow company
rules" and "stated that his 'hands were tied' by the tight job market and his
inability to fine employees for safety violations."' 5 9
The Commission also relied on Revoli's assignment of the laborer,
who was the owner's nephew and had a propensity for rule-breaking, to a
supervisor who had been unable to supervise him effectively in the past.
160
The Commission summarily rejected the company's unpreventable
employee misconduct defense based on the same facts which supported its
finding of constructive knowledge:
We also agree with the judge that Revoli failed to show that the
violation was the result of unpreventable employee misconduct.
Constr., No. 99-0707, slip op. at 6-7 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr.
25, 2001) (holding that a concrete contractor did not have constructive knowledge of its
worker's presence under a falling concrete bucket that killed him because the bucket
normally took a different path and the Secretary failed to show either that there were any
possible preventative measures or that the bucket's movement could have been anticipated).
151. Sec'y of Labor v. Revoli Constr. Col, Inc., No. 00-0315, slip op. at 3 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Dec. 7, 2001).
152. Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 3 n.2.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id. at 2.
160. Id. at 5.
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To prove that a violative condition results from unpreventable
employee misconduct, the employer must show that it had a work
rule that effectively implemented the requirements of the cited
standard and that the work rule was adequately communicated
and effectively enforced. The defense fails here largely for the
same reasons we find constructive knowledge. Revoli had a work
rule, but it did little to implement or enforce the rule. Therefore,
the defense fails. 61
V. THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT APPROACH
In choosing the appropriate legal framework for review of an OSHA
citation, the Commission will first determine whether a supervisor had
actual knowledge of the conduct violative of the cited standard.6 2 If the
answer is no, then the Secretary must prove that the employer has
constructive knowledge.'6 3 As discussed above, the Secretary may satisfy
its burden by showing that the employer could have discovered the
violative condition with the exercise of reasonable diligence.' 64 If the
Secretary cannot demonstrate that the employer has failed to meet its
obligation to have adequate work rules and training programs, to
adequately supervise employees, to anticipate hazards to which employees
may be exposed, and to take measures to prevent the occurrence of
violations, the citation will be dismissed."6' If the Secretary satisfies its
burden, the employer may raise the affirmative defense of unpreventable
employee misconduct. 66 However, as shown above, the employer's efforts
to do so will typically be futile because the Commission has repeatedly
held that facts sufficient to support a finding of constructive knowledge
161. Id. at 6 n.3 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Sec'y of Labor v.
Hackensack Steel Corp., No. 97-0755 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n
Sept. 25, 2003) (finding that a steel erection subcontractor had constructive knowledge of its
non-supervisory steelworkers' failure to wear hard hats and use fall protection equipment
based on: (1) the subcontractor's failure to supervise/monitor steelworkers; (2) the
employer's awareness of the need for increased monitoring because of fourteen final
Commission orders over the previous seven years; and (3) the failure to inform the foreman
of previous citations on work sites where he was in charge); Sec'y of Labor v. RK Hydro-
Vac, Inc., No. 03-1583, slip op. at 8 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Dec.
15. 2003) (Spies, A.L.J.) (rejecting the employer's employee misconduct defense "for the
same reasons that constructive knowledge was held to be established.").
162. Sec'y of Labor v. Revoli Constr. Co., Inc., No 00-0315, slip op. at 5 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Dec. 7, 2001).
163. Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Indus., Inc., No. 99-0191, slip op. at 8 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003).
164. Id. at5-6.
165. Id. at 17-18.
166. Sec'y of Labor v. S&G Packaging Co., No. 98-1107, slip op. at 8 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 2, 2001).
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will conclusively demonstrate that the employee's misconduct was
preventable.
67
If a supervisor has knowledge of the conduct violative of the standard,
the Commission will look to the law of the Circuit to which the decision
could be appealed to determine whether the supervisor's knowledge
may be imputed to the employer. 168 In the majority of the Circuits, the
supervisor's knowledge will be strictly imputable to the employer.1 69
However, if the decision could be appealed to the Third, Fourth, Ninth or
Tenth Circuits, the Secretary must also satisfy any foreseeability
requirements imposed as part of the prima facie case under Circuit
precedent. 7 0
If the Secretary establishes its prima facie case, the employer
may raise the affirmative defense of unpreventable employee
misconduct.' 7 ' However, if the Secretary has already established the
foreseeability of the violation as required under the minority view, the
employer will be hard-pressed to establish that it could not prevent the
violation. 72  Accordingly, it appears that the unpreventable employee
misconduct defense is likely to succeed only where the employer can show
that the employee's conduct was idiosyncratic, implausible, or
unforeseeable, and where specific discipline has been imposed in the
past.
173
There are significant problems with the Commission's current
approach to this area of the law. It appears that the selection of analysis
between the Secretary's burden of proving employer knowledge and the
employer's burden of proving employee misconduct is outcome-
determinative (i.e., the employer has a far greater chance of prevailing if
the Commission analyzes the same facts under the former framework than
167. See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Danis-Shook Joint Venture XXV, No. 98-1192, slip op.
at 12 (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 2, 2001).
168. Sec'y of Labor v. Kerns Bros. Tree Serv., No. 96-1719, slip op. at 7 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Mar. 16, 2000) (citations omitted).
169. See New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 88 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.
1995); Brock v. L.E. Myers Co., 818 F.2d 1270, 1276 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
L.E. Myers Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Daniel Int'l Corp. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 683 F.2d 361, 364 (11th Cir. 1982); H.B. Zachry Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 638 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 1981); General
Dynamics Corp., Quincy Shipbuilding Div. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 599 F.2d 453, 459 (1st Cir. 1979); Danco Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 586 F.2d 1243, 1246-47 (8th Cir. 1978).
170. Sec'y of Labor v. Kerns Bros. Tree Serv., No. 96-1719, slip op. at 18 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Mar. 16, 2000).
171. Sec'y of Labor v. S&G Packaging Co., No. 98-1107, slip op. at 8 (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 2, 2001).
172. See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op. at 22
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003).
173. See id. at 5-6.
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under the latter). 174  Where employees violate safety rules without
supervisory presence, the employer will typically prevail, as in Interstate
Brands Corp. 75 and Donohue Industries, Inc. 76 If a supervisor is present,
as in Rawson Contractors177 and North Landing Line Construction Co.,178
the Commission will typically find employer knowledge, and then virtually
automatically apply the same analysis to reject the unpreventable employee
misconduct defense. The effect of this approach is to eviscerate the
affirmative defense, as employers invariably fail to establish this defense
where the Secretary has been found to establish employer knowledge. 179
Moreover, there is no analytical or logical reason why an employer
should be held more accountable when a supervisor violates an established
safety rule than when a non-supervisory employee does so. Where an
employer has a strong safety program with training and regular inspections,
it has taken all possible precautions, yet it may still be liable for a citation
based solely on the presence of a supervisor who improperly ignores the
rules he is required to enforce.
The current burden-shifting framework applied by the Commission
and the Courts of Appeals in reviewing OSHA citations is both confusing
and duplicative. A decision by the United States Supreme Court adopting
the foreseeability element required by the minority of Circuits would be
most welcome, as it would essentially collapse the unpreventable employee
misconduct defense into the foreseeability and constructive knowledge
tests. The analysis could be simplified even further by eliminating the
rather meaningless distinction between "supervisor knowledge plus
foreseeability"' 8 ° and "constructive knowledge,"' 8' and establishing a
uniform knowledge test applicable in all situations. Where the employer
174. Compare Sec'y of Labor v. Interstate Brands, No. 00-1077, slip op. (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 24, 2003) and Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Industries,
No. 99-0191, slip op. (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003) with
Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op. (Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003) and Sec'y of Labor v. N. Landing Line Constr. Co.,
No. 96-721, slip op. (Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n July 20, 2001).
175. Sec'y of Labor v. Interstate Brands Corp., No. 00-1077, slip op. (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 24, 2003).
176. Sec'y of Labor v. Donohue Indus., Inc., No. 99-0191, slip op. (Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm'n Aug. 29, 2003).
177. Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op. (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003).
178. Sec'y of Labor v. N. Landing Line Constr. Co., No. 96-721, slip op. (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n July 20, 2001).
179. See Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op.
(Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003); Sec'y of Labor v. N.
Landing Line Constr. Co., No. 96-721, slip op. (Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n July 20, 2001).
180. See supra Part IV.B.
181. See supra Part H.A.2.
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knew or should have known of the violation, it should be held accountable,
as in situations, for example, where the employer fails to establish
compliance requirements for OSHA standards or ignores potential safety
and health issues. Where the employer has a strong safety program (with
regular training and inspections supported by a disciplinary program) as in
Rawson Contractors,182 and an employee, whether supervisory or non-
supervisory, violates the rules and applicable standards, the violation
should not be seen as foreseeable, and no citation should issue. Such a
formulation is logical, relatively easy to administer, and provides guidance
for employers, in contrast to the "confusing patchwork' ' 183 that is current
Commission precedent.
182. Sec'y of Labor v. Rawson Contractors, Inc., No. 99-0018, slip op. (Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n Apr. 4, 2003).
183. L.E. Myers Co., High Voltage Div. v. Sec'y of Labor, 484 U.S. 989, 990
(1987) (White, J., dissenting from order denying certiorari).
